The Stillborn Palestinian State (Part 1 of 2)

It is not an exaggeration to say that all of "progressive mankind" is now completely crazy about the idea of establishing a new Palestinian state in the lands called Yehuda, Shomron and Aza (collectively known as YESHA, and nowadays referred to as "the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,"). Israel liberated these lands from Jordan and Egypt, (as a result of two defensive wars in 1967 and 1973), who unlawfully occupied them in 1948. Although there is no substance whatsoever to their declarations, the supporters of this idea desperately try to convince everyone (themselves first of all) that as soon as a viable Palestinian state is established on the lands of YESHA, peace will descend upon the Middle East.

This idea has existed for more than twenty years, but for some reason no one has been able to see that a state built this way will be stillborn. It will be nonviable, unable to exist. It will be a ticking time-bomb, the unavoidable explosion of which will lead not only to the disappearance of this corpse-state itself, but could also cause Israel's destruction and potentially even lead to the nuclear apocalypse of World War Three.

All those who so stubbornly demand the creation of this corpse-state never stop to ask themselves what will happen after it is proclaimed. However, it is precisely the answer to this question that unequivocally demonstrates not only the hopelessly utopian nature of the idea, but more importantly the almost criminally ill-advised nature of any attempts to establish this state.

Before discussing the objective reasons of the non-viability of a separate Arab state in YESHA, let us look at some subjective issues. Let us assume that, since we are talking about a sovereign Palestinian state, it will have certain characteristics common to all other sovereign countries. It will have sovereignty over its air and sea space, have an army, independently decide with which countries to sign treaties, be completely responsible for the defense of its borders, etc. Put another way, it will have the same unlimited rights and responsibilities that America, Russia, Egypt, Israel and any other sovereign state. Even the poorest and most bedraggled of nations make their own independent decisions on all important issues, which is what is meant by the term "sovereign state."

It does not require much explanation why Israel is categorically against such unlimited sovereignty for any Palestinian state in YESHA. Even the most ardent proponents of Arab rights, like Yossi Beilin and Shimon Peres, only talk about a demilitarized Palestinian state. They also mention several other restrictions that would be required, thus a priori curtailing the sovereignty of this state. Slightly rephrasing Orwell, we must admit that, in this particular case, the stalwarts of democracy and liberalism are unable to explain why, if all states are equal, some of them should be less equal.

Nevertheless, for the sake of argument, let us assume that Israel agrees to the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in YESHA. Israel does not care that this state might arm itself to the teeth with the most advanced weaponry, that it can sign military pacts with the fiercest of Israel's enemies, like Iran, Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia, and that it may place tens of thousands of missiles on its borders with Israel as Hizballah has done on the Israeli-Lebanese border.

So, for the sake of an argument, a sovereign Palestinian state is created in YESHA. Since the main goal of the supporters of such a state is Peace, it make sense to inquire into Arab expectations regarding this state. An abundance of polls taken during the last two years will give clear answers to many questions. For instance, a poll taken in mid-February 2002 by Bir-Zeit University revealed that "of 1,198 Palestinians polled in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 49.5% said that a future Palestinian state and Israel could not coexist peacefully." This is very consistent with many similar polls taken since November 2000, according to which 50 to 60 percent of Palestinian Arabs are convinced that "there is no chance for peaceful coexistence between the two peoples after an independent Palestinian state had been established next to the Israeli state."

When respondents of a December 2001 survey were asked "if a future Palestinian state should adopt a school curriculum that recognizes Israel and teach schoolchildren not to demand the return of all Palestine to the Palestinians," 90.7 percent of the respondents "opposed or strongly opposed such a change in curriculum." In a November 2000 poll, 74.3 percent of those surveyed answered that "even if East Jerusalem were to come under Palestinian sovereignty, they still would not accept Israeli sovereignty over West Jerusalem." When asked in the same poll about "refugees," 91.5 percent answered that they believe that "peace is not possible if Israel does not recognize the right of Palestinian refugees to return."

Taking into account this very "friendly" attitude of the proposed Palestinian country towards Israel, and keeping in mind other previous "good will gestures" made by the Palestinians, such as murderous terrorist activity against Israelis, it is safe to assume that Israel will try to have as little contact as possible with this new country. Now, again for the sake of argument, let us assume that Israel builds absolutely impregnable border installations and the Israelis do not concern themselves at all with the activities of their newly independent neighbors. The Arabs wanted complete independence -- fine, they can have it, but Israel is no longer obliged to provide for their employment.

Now it is time to take a look at this corpse-state in order to understand the objective reasons that make it stillborn. First, it consists of two disconnected segments: 138 sq. miles in the Gaza strip and 2,129 sq. miles in the West Bank, or a total of 2,268 sq. miles. According to data from July 2001, the population of Gaza consisted of 1,180,000 people and the West Bank of 2,100,000 people. 49.6% of the population in Gaza and 44.6% of inhabitants of the West Bank are children under the age of 15.

This means that this population doubles every 15-16 years, and, by 2050, Gaza will be home to 8-10 million Arabs and the West Bank to 11-14 million Arabs (population growth rate in Gaza is 4.01%, and in the West Bank 3.48%). This is without taking into account ANY increase in population due to the influx of so-called "refugees," at least part of whom will theoretically move into this newly established state.

Already today the average population density in the Gaza strip is one of the highest (if not the highest) in the world with 3,277 people per sq. kilometer. This is 1000% higher than in Japan, which is one of the world's most densely populated nations (338 people per sq. kilometer). In the West Bank the population density is 372 people per sq. kilometer.

We will not even attempt to solve the problems of this corpse-state related to the necessity of maintaining a minimum subsistence level for people stuffed like herring into a barrel. We shall only mention that thus far the Arabs have been mainly able to survive through being employed in Israel and YESHA. Even if the leadership of the corpse-state were to attempt to resolve these problems, it is doubtful that it can succeed for a number of reasons. It is enough to mention the complete lack of infrastructure (especially if Israel stops supplying power and water), the lack of any valuable natural resources, and the complete lack of industry (today there exist only small family businesses).

However, let us assume an absolutely impossible thing -- that the Arabs become as hardworking as the Japanese, and that the other Arab countries, after the creation of this corpse-state immediately start to provide it with all sorts of aid. And that all this aid and monetary donations is funneled towards improving the wellbeing of the people, and not towards purchasing military equipment, which is what all the other Arab countries do without exception. Even in this science-fiction scenario the two-segment entity will be unable to survive.

1. Kimberley Kelly, Thomas Homer-Dixon. Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The Case of Gaza. 1995 paper. www.library.utoronto.ca/pcs/eps/gaza/gaza1.htm

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